Representation and State Formation in the Canadas, 1790-1850

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It is now thirty years since the revival of interest in the nineteenth century English 'revolution in government,' yet similar changes in the Canadas have received remarkably little attention. This is despite the fact that changes in the structure of colonial governance in many instances directly paralleled those in the imperial state and despite the fact that many of the protagonists of imperial political reform played important roles in the same processes in the Canadas. 'Responsible' (i.e. ministerial) government was at least a novel practice in England when agitation for it began in the Canadas. Attacks on the Lords in England coincided with the movement for an elective Legislative Council in the Canadas, and later coincident reforms were in the areas of public health, and labour legislation. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century close links existed between Canadian Reformers and English Radicals and liberal Whigs. William Lyon Mackenzie, for instance, communicated with Lord Brougham directly and acted as the Canadian agent for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Other Canadian Reformers visited English Radical circles, and several of the Radicals themselves were Canadian landowners.
With rare exceptions, the standard texts on Canadian political development have ignored the practical reconstruction of political rule under the Union of 1840. Durham, his Radical companions, and Poulett Thomson figure with the Baldwins, Lafontaine and Ryerson as the heroes of hegemonic history, notable primarily for their preoccupation with Canadian independence, and even more critical analyses have shared this preoccupation. That there was a restructuring of government has been noted but the examination of novel practices of governance inside the Canadas has been largely ignored.

Given this context, Bernier and Salée present a welcome call for a historical analysis of the processes of Canadian state formation in ‘Social Relations and Exercise of State Power in Lower Canada (1790-1840)’ (SPE #22). Such a study, they suggest, will point to the origins of political forms and practices which remain with us in contemporary Canadian politics. They call repeatedly for an analysis which will enable us to “identify the practices of domination — the exercise of power — and to determine how they objectified the state institutional structure.” This is to be done “by analyzing the practices through which the state exercised power.”

To their credit, Bernier and Salée attempt to combine an analysis of personnel in key branches of the state — the Executive and Legislative Councils and the judiciary — with an exposition of the activities of the central authorities. Yet their account focuses on the class background of state personnel, not on the conduct of rule either at the center of authority, or through local government. They emphasize that a majority of members of the Executive and Legislative Councils and key members of the judiciary were large landed proprietors. This is held to sustain the conception of an “absolutist” state in Lower Canada and to explain its activities: because the occupants of key branches of the colonial state were large landed proprietors, “feudal philosophy” determined their activities and the “authoritarianism and paternalism of the ancien régime constituted the foundations for the exercise of power at all levels.” These propositions are supported by a brief investigation of the activities of the executive and judicial branches. The former is shown to have refused key bills aimed at creating institutions of local electoral government (by male
proprieters), the latter to have acted against the opposition press and opposition electoral candidates.

This type of analysis is doubly unsatisfactory, if only because the Poulantzas-Miliband debates of the early 1970s demonstrated the inadequacy of attempts to understand a monolithic entity called 'the State' either in terms of its personnel alone, or in terms of the class interests which its functioning seems to embody. At least, Bernier and Salée attempt to forward the analysis of state formation by combining an investigation of personnel and practices. But this attempt remains at the level of a rather mechanical instrumentalism: the class background of individuals directly and simply determines the activity of their 'instrument' the state.

A more useful approach is presented by Corrigan and Sayer, who emphasize the necessity of avoiding the reification of 'the State.' They argue that 'the state' can best be understood as a process of rule in and through which the activities of classes and groups lead to the creation, solidification and normalization of political forms and practices (in the largest sense). From this point of view, class hegemony is seen neither as an 'instrument' nor as the unmediated expression of an economic class interest, but rather as a continuously problematic process of the reproduction of relations of property and authority. For the historian of state formation in the Canadas, such a view focuses attention on the internal contradictions of structures of governance. One must ask, how was rule possible, and at the same time, what were the limitations of particular ways of ruling? The tracing out of forms of rule and practices of governance is crucial for such an approach.

Bernier and Salée neglect the processes of rule at the local level. Rule does not consist simply of legislative enactments, nor of the blocking of such enactments by oligarchies. To be real and effective, rule must appear practically in the behaviour, activity, understandings, etc. of those who are ruled. Practices and forms of practice must exist which link the initiatives and projects of the ruling class with the experience of the ruled. The 'state' resides at least as much in these linkages and in the experience of the ruled as it does in "bodies of armed men and their material appendages."

I propose here an examination of the problem of governing the Canadas in the period from 1791 to 1850. I focus upon
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what I take to be the central problematic of state formation in this period: the failure of the imperial state to establish in the colony a workable version of the modalities of rule prevalent in the imperium and known as 'Old Corruption,' and the related 'revolution in government' of the nineteenth century.

The structure of Canadian government under the Constitutional Act of 1791 worked against three elements which, by the 1830s if not before, were taken by English Radicals and Whigs to be central to the solidification and maintenance of class hegemony. I call these respectively, the 'Educational Idea' and 'Representative Government,' and the 'Inspective Function.' The first two refer to the growing consensus among members of the governing classes that social order must be based upon the practical habituation of the population to the operation of parliamentary and narrowly representative forms of rule. This consensus arose out of what Thompson has called the "crisis of moral economy" consequent upon the generalization of industrial capitalist relations of production. 'Free labour' could no longer be governed through direct supervision and personal contact between rulers and ruled. New relations of production created a new physical and political distance between classes. In this condition, rule was to be founded on the political subjectification of the population, and this was to be effected through a double educational process. On the one hand, direct socialization in habits and beliefs congenial to bourgeois hegemony was to be provided in schools for the bulk of the population. On the other hand, participation in the management of limited agencies of local government (including schools) would practically train 'the people' (adult male proprietors) to conduct aspects of their own governance in limited representative forms. Schooling in a double sense was ruling. At the same time, this entailed an expansion of the sphere of political action of men of property and the collapse of the political will of society into the disciplined will of these men. Men of property were to govern propertyless men through public institutions, and men generally would govern women and children through their dominance in the household.

Although the balance of class forces in the colonial context was different from that in the imperial state in the 1830s and
1840s, parallel forms of class/cultural distance obtained in the two instances. To English Radicals and Whigs, French Canadians and republican farmers were at least as alien as English proletarians.10

The 'Inspective Function' refers to the development of connections between central authorities and local sites which centred upon knowledge/power relations. The capacity of central government to put in place key elements of policy and police was increasingly seen to depend upon the supervision of local provision. This required loyal agents at the local level who could gather and transmit specified elements of intelligence. This intelligence would enable the central authority to monitor local provision, to identify sources of conflict, to discover and generalize administrative innovation, and to intervene to overcome barriers to the realization of policy or the success of police. Inspection became generalized in England in the 1830s.11

**Governing the Canadas, 1791-1840** The nature of governmental forms in the Canadas was at the centre of colonial political struggle at least until the granting of parliamentary autonomy in the late 1840s. Before the Union of 1840, the scope and capacity of local representative governmental bodies was sharply restricted. This was an intentional creation of the framers of the Constitutional Act of 1791, but in practice it had the unintended consequence of sharply limiting the force of the central authority.

The authors of the Constitutional Act understood the American Rebellion as the product of the development of local democratic government in the American colonies in the absence of the salutary influence of a hereditary aristocracy. The institution of the New England town meeting was seen to be particularly culpable as a forum for the fomentation of democratic 'excess.'12 As Lord Grenville, Secretary of State for Colonies, argued in his outline of a proposed constitution for the Canadas,

To the want of an intermediate Power, to operate as a check, both on the misconduct of Governors, & on the democratical Spirit, which prevailed in the Assemblies, the defection of the American Provinces, may perhaps be more justly ascribed, than to any other
general cause which can be assigned. And there seems to be no one point of more consequence, in this country, than the labouring to establish, in the remaining provinces, a respectable Aristocracy, as a support, & safe guard to the Monarchy, removed, that is, at so great a distance, & on that account, so much less powerful, in its weight and influence upon the people at large.\(^\text{13}\)

Lord Dorchester, Governor of Quebec, suggested that the Crown retain parcels of five thousand acres in every township in order “to create and strengthen an Aristocracy, of which the best use may be made on this Continent, where all Governments are feeble and the general conditions of things run to a wild Democracy.”\(^\text{14}\) Dorchester claimed that even “people of property” in the United States had come to realize “the evils rendered by” the absence of an aristocracy, “and would bring forward an adequate remedy, did they know how to carry it into execution.”\(^\text{15}\) However, both the Governor of Quebec and the Secretary of State for Colonies were constrained to accept the political principle established by the American rebels: ‘no taxation without representation.’ Henceforth, (until the 1840s) elected Assemblies were needed to initiate money bills.

Still, the framers of the Constitutional Act hoped for the creation of a Canadian aristocracy through the distribution of colonial lands. Grenville sought a Canadian parallel to the English Lords, a hereditary aristocracy ‘unlimited in point of number,’ which would occupy the colonial upper house and whose local activity would form the basis of governance. However, Dorchester was opposed and eventually members of the colonial upper house—the Legislative Council—were appointed for life during good behaviour. Dorchester regarded the attempt to use land and inheritance as unstable mechanisms for the creation of an aristocracy. Given the “fluctuating state of Property” in the colony, which would “expose all hereditary honors to fall into disregard,” it would be safer to select members of the Legislative Council “from among the men of property, where talents, integrity, and a firm attachment to the Unity of the Empire may be found.”\(^\text{16}\)

The constitution bestowed upon the Canadas by the Act of 1791 was considered by the Colonial Office to be exceptionally liberal. The representative of the King, the Lieutenant-Governor, was to be advised by an appointed Executive Council,
holding office during pleasure. Parliament was to consist of an appointed Legislative Council, whose members would hold office for life during good behaviour, and an elected House of Assembly, whose members were to be adult male propertyholders. Both the Legislative Council and the Governor-in-Council exerted powers of veto over enactments of the elective branch, although money bills originated in the latter. After 1831, the elected Assemblies also controlled the Civil List.

Town and township meetings of naturalized male proprietors were created in the Canadas, and the franchise was set at 40s freehold. However, the officers these meetings could appoint were functionaries without powers either of policy formation or of taxation: poundkeepers, assessors, collectors, pathmasters, fenceviewers, and so forth. Local powers of taxation and administration were mainly in the hands of appointed justices, who exercised such power either individually or together when assembled for Quarter Sessions. Officers appointed by town meetings executed functions specified either by justices or by Acts of Parliament. The magistracy was not itself stipendiary, nor were other local governmental officials salaried.

Limitations of Central Authority The capacity of the central authority to intervene practically and continuously at the local level was sharply limited in the period before 1840 by the absence of regular connections between centre and locality. Although census information of some sort was collected more or less systematically from the 1810s, there were relatively few central initiatives undertaken in the domain of systematic social policy, or indeed few that could have been undertaken, before the 1840s. Despite the desires of the framers of the Constitutional Act, class relations in the Canadas did not approximate those in the imperial state. No colonial aristocracy came into existence, on the one hand, and the relatively easy access to land which existed freed the 'lower orders' from direct dependence on their social superiors, at least in Upper Canada and in the new townships of Lower Canada. In practice, in Upper Canada especially, this meant the absence of both a dominant class of proprietors capable of translating central policy into effective local practices, and the absence of the
representative governmental powers which existed in the United States.

Of course, a certain qualification of this analysis is necessary. Local elites certainly existed in Upper Canada, and access to governmental office was severely restricted. In many parts of the colony, leading proprietors acted in ways which sustained an authority structure based upon private property in the means of production and its correlates: patriarchy and official religion. One need only think of Colonel Talbot, Mahlon Burwell, Hamnett Pinhey, or the Cartwrights. But what is important to stress is that the structure of governance characteristic of England, in which local authority was sustained through the social and economic dominance of small elites (a notion already under serious attack from the early 1800s), was not replicated in the Canadas. To this cause, and to the policy of creating Crown and Clergy Reserves, was attributed the relative economic and social backwardness of the Canadas in comparison with the United States.

In practice, the absence of both a local aristocracy and representative government resulted in a situation in which the superintendence, verification and certification of the operation of central policies and projects was executed largely through the appointment of special or extraordinary officers — usually called commissioners or overseers. There were important exceptions in Upper Canada. Appointed District Boards of Education were created in 1816 and were subordinated to an appointed General Board of Education in 1823. The importance of a central educational intervention was recognized by the colonial governing classes quite early, and attempts were made to regulate local schools. However, the General Board itself was disbanded in 1833, after persistent attacks upon it by Reformers, and District Boards of Education followed no consistent educational policy. The Provincial Penitentiary, created by an Act of Parliament in 1832, was supervised by a board of five inspectors, who were to meet every two months in the institution and who were to submit an annual report. The inspectors could formulate rules and regulations for the institution, but there was only one Penitentiary, the inspectors were unpaid, and in any case they were accused in 1849 of performing their functions haphazardly at best.
Inspectors appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor under an Act of 1803 were to issue licences and collect fees from the distillers of alcoholic beverages, and the keepers of billiard tables. Finally, (and given an analysis of knowledge/power relations, importantly) Assessors, Clerks of the Peace and District Treasurers were chosen by annual town meetings, and these officials collected and transmitted to the central authority such key elements of local intelligence as reports on classes of households and categories of persons. This aspect of central governmental capacity attracted regular parliamentary attention, and in 1823 a joint committee produced legislation which systematized the information gathering and reporting procedures. Parliament specified the categories of information collected. With these main exceptions, each of the relatively few projects for local improvement undertaken in Upper Canada demanded a special act of parliament to set it in motion, and each involved the naming of special overseers or commissioners to manage it.

In the domain of communications, justices of the peace were initially appointed commissioners of roads with fairly broad powers for planning and taxation. This failed to produce much improvement in internal communications, and by the 1830s, when Parliament was appropriating fairly large sums annually for road construction, Commissioners were appointed at the District level to supervise road building and to account for monies. Overseers of highways elected by town meetings kept lists of those liable to statute labour, and arranged for its compounding. The construction of bridges, such as those over the Trent, Don, Humber, Grand and Thames rivers, was centrally financed and supervised by Commissioners appointed specially in each case by the Lieutenant-Governor. Separate acts of parliament named commissioners to supervise the improvement of internal navigation and the construction of particular canals, the dredging of particular harbours, and the building of individual lights. Macadamized roads were established by special enactment as well, and in 1840 trustees of these roads were united by a further enactment into Commissioners of District Turnpike Trusts.

Appointed Commissioners supervised the construction of Kingston General Hospital which was subsidized by parliament acting in response to the cholera epidemic of 1832. But since
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no local authority existed to maintain or fund the actual operations of a hospital, the building sat empty until 1841 when it was temporarily occupied by Queen's College. Appointed commissioners were to supervise any asylum constructed under an enabling act passed in 1839, and special commissioners were to regulate the pretended Bank of Upper Canada. These special commissioners and overseers were casual. Their activity was not routinized and, with the possible and limited exception of the Penitentiary inspectors, they were not travelling functionaries. Their activity was bound to a particular locality and project; they did not accumulate information about all projects in a particular class, nor, insofar as we know, about matters other than the particular bridge, road, harbour, or light for which they were commissioned. This limited the capacity of central government to form a general view of the comparative development of local improvements, or to implement colony-wide policy.

The absence of systematic organs of local government seriously limited the capacity of the central government to institute and carry out any social policy and police on a continuous and regular basis. A similar lack in England was compensated to a degree by the existence of large proprietors to whom extensive powers were granted. But even in the English case, the 1830s saw important alterations in the relations of local governance known as 'Old Corruption.' In the comparatively democratic conditions of the Canadas, the influence of property in the locality was less marked, not the least because of a high degree of absentee holding.

Education and Central Capacity Before and immediately after the Rebellions of 1837-8, the absence of central capacity in the locality was seen as problematic, both to the colonial office and to members of colonial political parties. This is particularly evident in the area of educational policy, which in both parts of the colony came to be seen as a key means for the maintenance of authority relations based on 'security of property.' In Upper Canada, Reform efforts in this regard were capped by the Duncombe report of 1836 which urged a systematic programme of local education. Duncombe's school legislation assumed the creation of organs of representative
educational governance in the locality.\textsuperscript{29} The Legislative Councillor Robert Baldwin Sullivan attributed the Rebellion of 1837 to the absence of state-directed education, but the Legislative Council vetoed Burwell's School Act of 1839 on the grounds of excessive taxation.\textsuperscript{30} The Gosford Commission of 1836, sent to investigate the turbulent conditions in Lower Canada, was officially enjoined by Lord Glenelg to attend closely to educational conditions.\textsuperscript{31} All of these plans and projects assumed the existence of substantial organs of local government. Even in Lower Canada the direct appointment of schoolmasters by parliament was sharply criticized.

This is not to insist that representative local government was a uniformly popular demand. We do not in fact know what the majority of the Canadian population thought or felt about this question. The absence of representative government, on the one hand, encouraged the development of various forms of communal self-management, forms which were destroyed through the establishment of representative institutions.\textsuperscript{32} On the other hand, the governing classes represented in the Legislative Council were strenuously opposed to local representative institutions. In 1839, a Committee of Council which examined Lord Durham's \textit{Report on the Affairs of British North America} argued that the Rebellions were caused not by any defects in the structure of colonial government, but rather by "the proximity of the American frontier — the wild and chimerical notions of civil government broached and discussed there" and American immigration.\textsuperscript{33}

Yet other sections of the colonial governing classes clearly sought to create structures in the locality which would allow for the emplacement of measures of 'improvement' and disciplinary practices. Both the Durham \textit{Report} and Radical opinion in the imperial parliament urged the creation of institutions of local representative government in the Canadas, and as early as 1839 the promotion of such institutions was a matter of Whig policy. In contrast to the vision of an oligarchy exerting a tight and total control over political life, which Bernier and Salee present, both Reformers and moderate Tories in the colonies, and Whigs and Radicals in the imperial state, regarded oligarchic rule from the centre as ineffective and inefficient.
Debate over the Durham Report in Canadian historiography has focused upon its role in the coming of responsible government in the late 1840s. Martin and Manning, for instance, have justly criticized earlier views which attributed a central role to the Report, both by subjecting Durham's own conception of 'responsibility' to scrutiny, and by locating Durham, Buller, Wakefield and others in the context of English political debate. Yet it must be stressed that the Radicals advocated just the form of local representative government which was adopted in both the Canadas after the Act of Union of 1840.

**Representation as Discipline** For Radicals and Whigs in England in the late 1830s, local representative government in the Canadas was seen as an imperative necessity. Durham himself and the other members of his commission insisted that the absence of both local governmental organization and state education were at the root of colonial unrest. The absence of powers of local government impeded 'improvement.' Schools, mills, churches and roads were lacking because local proprietors did not have the governmental means to organize them. More important, the absence of such governmental structures meant that there was no "room for talent" to find expression within the state system. Arthur Buller, charged with investigating the educational condition of Lower Canada, reported that "talent" in the locality could find "no outlet under the present system" and hence was "endangering society by its irregular outbreaks." Charles Buller took a similar line in Responsible Government for Colonies. Colonial political disputes, he claimed, were made particularly heated since one of the few paths to individual betterment was central governmental office. These views were also expressed in a particularly influential form to the English cabinet by Edward Ellice. All of these writers were agitating for political structures which would incorporate men from the class of small capitalists and from the petty bourgeoisie.

John Stuart Mill publicized this Radical position in a series of articles on the Durham mission which appeared in the Westminster Review. There were four measures, "all of first-rate importance, all such as ought to have been given, even though not asked for," which Durham had been about to institute when his mission was cut short, Mill claimed. These were "free
municipal institutions," a general scheme of public education, a registry act for titles to landed property, and the commutation of feudal tenures in Montreal. Mill described institutions of representative government as "not only the grand instrument of honest local management, but the great 'normal school' to fit a people for representative government." Radicals and Whigs, Reformers and moderates all accepted these points; representative local governmental institutions were productive of a two-fold 'improvement' — first in standards of material life, and second, as educational institutions, they would prepare and train 'the people' in loyalty to, and in the operation of, the dominant modes of their own self-government and subordination.

Russell emphasized the same points in his communications with Poulett Thomson (later Sydenham and Toronto — the desire for a colonial aristocracy lingered), and included a detailed local government plan in his draft of a bill for the union of the Canadas. Russell certainly did not entertain any notion of colonial autonomy, but he did insist on the necessity of representative government. In official instructions in September 1839, Russell assumed Poulett Thomson would agree that English local governmental institutions were the only "mode in which local affairs can be ... properly administered, and ... they form ... the most appropriate and effectual means of training the great body of the people to the higher branches of legislation." A month later, while urging Poulett Thomson to oppose any push for "responsible government," Russell again stressed that the imperial government was "intent on giving to the talent and character of leading persons in the colonies, advantages similar to those which talent and character employed in the public service, obtain in the United Kingdom." People with 'talent and character' were, of course, men in the capitalist and professional classes.

Poulett Thomson was himself intensely critical of the government of Upper Canada. "Much as I dislike Yankee institutions," he wrote to a friend, "I would not have fought against them, which thousands of these poor fellows, whom the Compact call rebels, did, if it were only to keep up such a Government as they got." But, to Poulett Thomson's chagrin and dismay, the Union Act of 1840 did not include a local government clause. Imperial Tories, led by Peel and Stanley, forced
the Whig ministry to abandon the clauses in question. "No man in his senses," complained Sydenham to a friend, "would think for a moment of the Union without its being accompanied by some sort of Local Government, in which the people may control their own officers, and the executive at the same time obtain some influence in the country districts."43

Poulett Thomson highlighted the twin dangers of attempting to govern the Canadas without the disciplinary and mediating influence of local government. Parliament was forced to adopt "powers equally dangerous to the subject and to the Crown," and he continued,

The people receive no training in the those habits of self-govern-ment which are indispensable to enable them rightly to exercise the power of choosing representatives in Parliament. No field is open for the gratification of ambition in a narrow circle, and no opportunity given for testing the talents or integrity of those who are candidates for popular favour. The people acquire no habits of self-dependence for the attainment of their own local objects. Whatever uneasiness they may feel...affords grounds for complaint against the executive. . . .

Representative government, Poulett Thomson stressed, would remove "Government" from this dangerous contact with "the people." He continued,

while the Government is thus brought directly in contact with the people, it has neither any officer in its own confidence in the different parts of these extended provinces from whom it can seek information, nor is there any recognized body enjoying the public confidence with whom it can communicate, either to determine what are the real wants and wishes of the locality, or through whom it may afford explanations.

Hence the readiness with which a demand for organic changes in the constitution has been received by the people.44

It must be stressed that institutions of representative government were not seen by their partisans as 'democratic' institutions. They were not intended 'to bring government to the people;' or at least not in the common interpretation of freeing and empowering. Rather, representative governmental institutions were to stand between 'the people' and the 'Government,' disciplining the former, habituating them to the limitation of their political power, to the containment of their 'talents'
in 'a narrow circle,' situating the source of their potential complaints in their own activity. At the same time, through representative institutions, the 'Government' was informed about local activity and a mobility channel was created for the ambitious.

However, Sydenham was left to engineer the passage of a local government act through the first session of the united parliament. This feat, he claimed, was only possible because he had already enacted it in Lower Canada before the union in his capacity as virtual dictator of that part of the colony. In the midst of acrimonious debate, the first session of the united parliament laid much of the groundwork for a complete transformation in the organization of political governance. In addition to the District Councils Act, a new board of works, a new system of county courts, a new system for regulating granted lands and a school act for Canada East and West were created. Divisions among parties and classes remained: Reformers struggled unsuccessfully for the election rather than the appointment of District Wardens, Clerks and Treasurers, for instance, but did succeed in sharply curtailing the centralized educational organization proposed by Sydenham. Nonetheless, from 1841 the main prerequisites for the systematic extension of central governmental capacity existed in the Canadas. Local bodies with taxation powers and relative autonomy for the pursuit of specific improvements existed. Central government could potentially use local bodies both as sources of intelligence and as means for the execution of colony-wide policy.

Still, these possibilities had to be translated into effective practices. In the decade of the 1840s, the most important agency for the elaboration and implementation of central political initiatives was that of education, especially in Canada West.

**Inspection and Education in Canada West, 1840-1850** The role of the education office in Canada West in the elaboration of modern state policy and practice has been largely neglected in Canadian administrative history. Hodgetts, for instance, was content to refer his readers to a collection of documents. Gidney and Lawr have attempted to chronicle the administrative development of the office for the 1840s, but beyond this
much remains to be done. Yet the office was of central importance. Education budgets until well into the twentieth century formed the largest item of social expenditure. Administrative practices pioneered in education were generalized to other agencies. For instance, the practice of paying local officers a portion of monies passing through their hands, in lieu of salary, was ended in the late 1840s for education, a decade before the rest of the public service. Audits of township school monies were instituted in 1853, well before the first Canadian Audit Act of 1855, and other financial reforms were pioneered by the education office. While the Civil Service Act of 1857 created a Board of Examiners (which functioned sporadically) for civil service applicants, teachers underwent increasingly regular examinations in front of County Boards of Public Instruction from 1851.

Of more immediate interest is the phenomenon of educational inspection. It was the education acts and the activities of the education office which led to the creation of the first corps of salaried and travelling inspectors in Canadian administration. The construction of a system of public education (or public instruction) was situated in a multi-faceted process of political struggle which I have detailed elsewhere. Here I wish simply to outline the relation between the growth of central governmental capacity in Canada West and the changing character and organization of educational inspection. It should be borne in mind that educational organization was at the heart of projects for the stabilization of bourgeois hegemony in the mid-nineteenth century, and that education itself is a form of governance.

The draft school bill formulated by Sydenham and introduced to the Assembly by Charles Day in 1841 envisaged the creation of a locally managed elementary educational system in which policy would be determined by an appointed central authority. Sydenham's plan closely resembled that elaborated for the instruction of the patriotes by Arthur Buller. Schools would be created and managed by an appointed Chief Superintendent of Education with broad powers to formulate rules and regulations and to collect information. District schools were to be managed by District Boards of Examiners appointed by the Chief Superintendent. Members of these Boards were to examine all teachers, and they were to function as
paid full-time school inspectors. District Councils were made District Boards of Education charged with defining school units and levying rates for the construction and maintenance of schools. In the Townships, electors were to elect five Commissioners of Common Schools responsible to Boards of Examiners. Commissioners were to regulate the day-to-day management of schooling. In towns and cities, Boards of Examiners were to be appointed directly by the Governor General and were to function as Boards of Education with taxation powers of their own.

Sydenham’s bill proposed the first regular salaried inspectoral corps for the Canadas and sought the creation of a regulated connection between a central authority and local sites of provision. However, the bill was attacked by Reformers in committee and seriously altered. The School Act of 1841 increased the powers of local representative bodies, while limiting the powers of the central authority.

Under the School Act of 1841, the Chief Superintendent managed parliamentary school monies and was charged with visiting every district annually to collect information about the character and conduct of schools. District Boards of Examiners existed only for the towns. In the countryside, the District Council served as a Board of Education, and five commissioners elected in each township were to formulate school rules, define the course of study, examine and license teachers, and resolve all disputes. Each commissioner was charged with the management of one or more schools, and the commissioners were to appoint two of their number as school inspectors to visit all township schools monthly. Commissioners were unpaid. They were to report to the District Board of Education, which in turn was to report annually to the Chief Superintendent, as a condition of receiving a share of the annual parliamentary school grant.

In practice the Act did not work well. District Councils were created only after the School Act (which presumed their existence) was in effect. Some Councils then refused to support the Act at all, or did so for a considerable period. No funds were provided for administrative machinery in the education office, and some townships neglected to elect school commissioners. Still, after the appointment of an Assistant Superintendent for Canada West (Robert Murray), forms for educa-
tional reporting were distributed to District Councils and an active campaign was undertaken to gather information useful for the reconstruction of the system. Some commissioners of common schools prepared detailed and elaborate regulations for the management of schooling and undertook a vigorous inspection.

General dissatisfaction with the Act in parliament led the Baldwin-Lafontaine ministry to draft a replacement bill in 1842. Guided through the House by the moderate Reformer Francis Hincks, the School Act of 1843 abolished the office of commissioner of common schools and placed each common school under the direct management of three locally elected school trustees. The taxation powers of District Boards of Education were extended and Reformers sought to organize the superintendence of local schooling through the creation of a large and ‘respectable’ inspectoral corps. The Act envisaged the appointment of Township Superintendents by Township Councils and District Superintendents by District Councils. Each of these officials was to post a large performance bond and each could enter schools at will, examine teachers and students, and license candidates for teaching. No unlicensed teacher was eligible to receive any public school money. However, the failure of the Municipal Bill of 1843 limited the importance of Township Superintendents, and the performance bond was so high relative to the income derived from the office that in many townships superintendents could not be found to serve. Still, especially from 1843, the central education office began to receive an increasingly systematic and regular body of intelligence about the conduct and condition of education specifically, and about related social questions.

Reformers sought to organize colonial governance initially through a direct and heavy reliance upon the relative autonomy of all adult male proprietors in organs of local representative government. However, the imperial assault on colonial parliamentary autonomy under Lord Metcalfe led to efforts to restrict the educational autonomy of local proprietors and to institute a radically centralized educational organization and inspectoral practice. After the elections of 1844, and in part as a reward for his propaganda efforts against the Reformers, Egerton Ryerson was appointed Assistant Superintendent of
Education for Canada West and was charged with reconstructing the educational system. The results of Ryerson’s own lengthy investigation of education in Europe were published in 1846 in his *Report on a System of Public Elementary Instruction for Upper Canada*.

Ryerson’s main administrative proposition echoed that of Arthur Buller, the English Radical attached to the Durham mission. Buller insisted that educational plans were useless without “an honest and active inspection.” A broad and well-established European literature, with which the English ruling class was familiar, made the same point. Ryerson summarized this material in his *Report* and insisted that “it is now generally admitted that the education of the people is more dependent upon the administration, than upon the provisions of the laws relating to Public Instruction.”53

Ryerson and the administration which supported him insisted that while public schooling was essential for political order, the decentralized system created by Reformers contributed to political unrest because in it central governmental capacity was not sufficient to specify the content of local schooling and to enforce that content through active local administration. In drafting replacement legislation, Ryerson repeatedly stressed that under the Act of 1843 there might be as many school systems as there were townships. Effective educational governance in his view necessitated the central regulation of local practice. This was a matter of active administration, not simply of legislation.54

The School Act of 1846 put in place a radical educational centralization. Curriculum and pedagogy were to be specified by a centrally-appointed General Board of Education (the Council of Public Instruction after 1850). The appointed Chief Superintendent of Education for Canada West could formulate rules for school management and could withhold central grants from any school refusing to comply. The office of Township Superintendent was abolished, and District Superintendents appointed by District Councils were to inspect all schools at least annually, and to report a detailed and specified body of intelligence to the Chief Superintendent. The latter official could intervene directly in the affairs of any school, and could dispatch District Superintendents to investigate complaints.
Appeals of the decisions of any official could be directed to the Chief Superintendent as well.

Despite considerable opposition, the School Act of 1846 remained in force until mid-1850. In that year, in keeping with the new Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, educational inspection was decentralized to a certain degree.

**Policing the Inspectorate** While the Chief Superintendent was dependent upon district and urban Councils for the appointment of Superintendents, he propagandized actively for the appointment of people with the qualifications he considered necessary, and sent regular instructions to those appointed. Superintendents were instructed as to the categories of information they were to collect. The Headmaster of the Normal School, Thomas Jaffray Robertson (one of the first eight inspectors employed by the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland), published “On the Inspection of Common Schools” in 1848. Robertson insisted that an adequate inspection extended well beyond the school house. The competent inspector would investigate “the feeling of the neighbourhood” and would work at “removing prejudice” and at “supporting the authority of the Teacher” in the locality. All inspectoral visits should be secret, and in no case should advance warning be given.

District Superintendents retained a fair measure of independence from the central authority. The office was a local political appointment in some cases, and the party which dominated the District Council often named the Superintendent. In some Districts the office was particularly desirable, carrying an annual salary of as much as 200 pounds — about four times the artisanal wage. In other Districts, the Council refused even to cover expenses and Superintendents had to be both willing and able to subsidize their own office. At least one Superintendent — Hamnett Pinhey of the Dalhousie District — used his position as Superintendent and Warden of the District to work systematically against the School Acts, and more or less serious disputes raged between other local officers and the central authority. At least two Superintendents absconded with public monies.

Yet the measure of the efficacy of educational inspection resides not simply in the ability or inability of the center to
exert a minute control over these officers. What is at issue here is, rather, the creation of administrative structures manned (strictly speaking) by members of the respectable classes who were themselves motivated, at least in part, by a concern and desire to colonize civil society with a particular bourgeois culture. Debates between the central authority and its superintendents in Canada West were debates among respectable men and often men of property as well. The Chief Superintendent and District Superintendents shared a broadly common class position and class interests. The 37 men who held the office included 3 industrial capitalists, 7 large landed proprietors and merchants, 11 clergymen (including several supported from the Reserve Fund), 5 private venture schoolmasters, 4 members of the judiciary, a retired naval lieutenant, and a master cabinet maker, among others.59

Many Superintendents routinely sought approval and support from the central authority. William Hutton, for instance, consistently wrote to the Chief Superintendent before undertaking his annual tour to ask for special instructions. Several Superintendents habitually referred 'difficult' cases to the Chief Superintendent. Others attempted to define and provide solutions to general problems in the system of educational administration. By 1850, the Chief Superintendent was routinely dispatching District Superintendents to investigate complaints made to him.60

The operation of educational inspection created relatively stable and normal connections between the central authority and local provision. The central authority could thus monitor local provision, identify centers of opposition and resistance to its policy, and intervene to resolve menacing disputes or contain threatening practices. The connection of centre to locality also allowed for the publication of propaganda at the local site. Knowledge of educational activity allowed the Chief Superintendent to defend centralized education against opposition from within the governing classes. When his position was under attack from the left of the Reform party in 1849, for instance, Ryerson published a comparative educational table which he claimed demonstrated the growing support of the respectable classes for state education.61

Educational knowledge, it should be stressed, was powerful knowledge, knowledge which was 'statistical' in the classic sense.
of political arithmetic, constructed and used for political purposes. Superintendents’ reports were frequently based upon their ‘best estimates’ of information lacking from reports of school trustees. The Chief Superintendent commonly returned incomplete reports for additional information with the specific injunction that it be provided from the District Superintendent’s own ‘local knowledge.’ At the same time, administrative decisions ruled out the inclusion of certain kinds of information in the official picture. For instance when Ryerson wished to stress how little male teachers were paid, he left payment in kind (in the form of room and board) out of the calculation of salary.

Of course, one should not overestimate the degree of bureaucratic uniformity in the educational administration of the 1840s. This was a decade of experiment. The strengthening of a local state created new kinds of tensions between center and locality. In addition, no professional qualifications for elementary school inspectors existed in Ontario until 1871. Superintendents were guided much more closely by their own senses of ‘rightness,’ ‘fairness,’ ‘culture’ and ‘morality’ than by pre-established procedures. But what is especially important about this experimental practice is that from the understandings and activities of a particular class of men, specific ways of governing education were normalized as the obvious ways. Bourgeois hegemony must be understood historically as a continuously problematic accomplishment whose main dimension is precisely the transformation of certain ways of seeing, doing, and being, particular to one class, one sex and one ethnic group-into the only thinkable, rational, ‘efficient’ ways.

**Conclusion** “Changes in central/local relations,” Hennock points out in a review of the development of English local government, “were in the first instance due to a feature of the mid-nineteenth century that I have called the centralization of knowledge. . . . From the 1830s onward inspectors, travelling the country on behalf of central government departments, were able to assemble standardized information about different localities.” These practices were generalized to the Canadas in the decade of the 1840s, after the reform of local government made possible the execution of systematic social policy.
Panoptic modes of regulation were the necessary complement of the reconstruction of colonial governance underway in this decade. This reconstruction involved a certain democratization of rule by extending governmental powers exercised by adult male proprietors through institutions and practices of representation. These first steps in the creation of the local state were monitored closely by inspection, and shaped further by directly educational practices elaborated by the central authority. As the technology of rule has become more sophisticated and as the legitimacy of the right of the center to know local activity has been solidified, other mechanisms of administration — financial accounting, especially — have displaced inspectorial practice. The placing of the Canadian population under relations of state tutelage has come to be normalized as a natural 'fact of life,' and representative electoral government has achieved the same status. Alternatives to public education are as difficult for most people to conceive as are non-representative forms of democracy. Yet the educational state and the state of education in which the population is placed lie at the heart of bourgeois hegemony.

The revolution in colonial governance from the 1840s demands systematic attention. I have focused upon inspection as a form of rule and as a set of practices put in motion by a definite class of men. Yet other practices and instruments of governance were generalized after 1840, about which I have said nothing. As well, of course, inspectorial practice and other forms of governance were contested, and, without a detailed examination of their contestation, this analysis remains particularly one-sided. The scope for further research is enormous. Still, I wish to stress in conclusion that the reconstruction of the development of political governance in Canada must combine an analysis of the cultural understandings of the dominant classes with an investigation of changing class forces. The political institutions of bourgeois society owe their origins in part to a (continually contested) formalization of the cultural practices of the rising bourgeoisie. Their investigation demands an analysis which combines changing class forces with detailed empirical investigation of the activities of real individuals and groups in the complexity of their social experience. Furthermore, in the colonial period especially, such an analysis cannot take the Canadas as such as a unit of analysis. We must
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take care not to hypostasize the struggle for a national state in Canada.

Notes

As usual but no less seriously, my thanks to Philip Corrigan and Robert Lanning. This article comes out of our joint research, organized as the 'State Formation Project,' part one of which deals with the formation of an educational inspectorate in Canada West. Some of the research for this article was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and by the Research Office at Wilfrid Laurier University. Critical comments from three reviewers are also appreciated. All errors are mine alone.


2. For instance, J.A. Roebuck spent his early life in Lower Canada, and Edward Ellice possessed substantial lands in the same colony, as did Gibbon Wakefield somewhat later. Joseph Hume provided Canadian Reformers with an important voice in the imperial parliament. Colonial governors in the period of the Rebellion and the Union were men directly involved in 'revolutionizing' political governance in England. Bond Head was an Assistant Poor Law Commissioner under the 1834 Poor Law. Durham, for his part, was one of the authors of the Reform Bill (in addition to being Howick's - later Grey's - brother-in-law, and Elgin's father-in-law). For Poulett Thomson, see the following note.

3. Poulett Thomson (later Sydenham and Toronto) was elected first for Dover in the 1820s (Jeremy Bentham himself conducted the canvass), but later sat for Manchester. He was named vice-president of the Board of Trade in the Melbourne government of 1830, and became president in 1832. In this capacity he revived the office of Inspector-General of Imports and Exports, introduced the practice of double-entry bookkeeping into the national accounts, and transformed the Board of Trade into the main statistical department of the English state. The Commission appointed to formulate the Factories Regulation Act of 1833 reported to the Board of Trade, and the Act itself is commonly attributed in large measure to Thomson. His voyage to Canada was immediately preceded by a tour of Ireland to investigate the operation of the new Poor Law. His brother and biographer, Poulett Scrope, was the leading parliamentary agitator for an Irish Poor Law to be based on the Board of Works providing outdoor and work relief. He was also a supporter of the Irish national education board. Cf. Poulett Scrope, Life of Lord Sydenham, London: 1843, and entries in the Dictionary of National Biography, Michael Cullen, The Statistical Movement in Victorian Britain, London: 1975, places Thomson in close personal contact with Kay-Shuttleworth, Secretary to the Privy Council Committee on Education. Thomson's cabinet colleagues considered Canada a working vacation for him: a sort of bringing up to date of colonial practice.

5. Bernier and Salée, 106, 111; my emphasis.


10. The Canadian proletariat was in an early stage of formation in the 1830s and 1840s, concentrated on major construction projects, or engaged in seasonal labour in the woods and sawmills. Small-scale village manufacture was on the rise, but it took the railway boom of the 1850s to push forward the process of accumulation, and the famine migration to concentrate a proletarian population in the colonial towns. Throughout much of this period, small property in agriculture predominated in the class structure of Upper Canada/Canada West. See for instance, Kenneth Duncan, “The Irish Famine Migration and the Social Structure of Canada West,” *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 1965; Ruth Bleasdale, “Class Conflict on the Canals of Upper Canada in the 1840s,” *Labour et Travailleur*, 1981, 9-40; Michael Cross, “The Lumber Community of Upper Canada, 1815-1867” in J.M. Bumsted ed. *Canadian History Before Confederation*, Georgetown: 1972; L.A. Johnson, *History of the County of Ontario*, Whitby: 1973; G.A. Teeple, “Land labour and capital in pre-confederation Canada,” in *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, Toronto: 1972. The ‘economic base’ of the Canadas (to speak crudely), however, was not simply economic activity in the colony. The Canadas were *colonies*.

11. See Nancy Ball, *Her Majesty's Inspectorate, 1839-1849*, Edinburgh: 1971; also Corrigan and Sayer, *Great Arch*. One could do the same kind of prosopographical investigation of the links between imperial and colonial inspection that n.3 above suggests for Thomson and English state formation. One example: Francis Hincks drafted the School Act of 1843, which established inspectorial practice in Canada West. His cousin, William Hutton, was one of the first school inspectors (for the Victoria District). Hutton’s father sat
on one of the first Irish Education Commissions. Hincks' father taught at the Belfast Academical Institution. One of Hincks senior's students was Robert Sullivan, one of the first four inspectors appointed by the Irish Education Commission in 1832. Sullivan instructed John George Hodgins, later deputy minister of education for Canada West/Ontario, when the latter was in Dublin in 1846.

12. One should note, in contradistinction to Bernier and Salée's insistence on the 'pre-bourgeois' notion of both the colonies and the imperium, that several of the New England colonies were in fact joint stock companies. See William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, Toronto: 1952.


14. Dorchester to Sidney, 13 June 1787, in Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 948.

15. Dorchester to Sidney, 13 June 1787, in Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 948.

16. Dorchester to Grenville, 8 February 1790, in Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 1003.

17. This body is not actually named in the Act, but was based on later directives from the Colonial Office.

18. Collectors, for instance, were paid a percentage of the monies passing through their hands.


20. Bernier and Salée's claim that the “St. Lawrence valley was home to an aristocracy” must be read in this light. What is at issue here is not landownership as such, but rather activity. The English Radicals (of course extremely chauvinist observers) claimed that there were about 20 seigneurs and that these were largely impotent. See Sir C.P. Lucas, Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, Three Volumes, Oxford: 1912. One of the tasks which faces researchers concerned with colonial rule is the documentation of the processes of rule at the local level. One should also notice that the 'absolutist' thesis has its own history, and was particularly useful to an earlier generation of chauvinist historians concerned to present the French as fit only for despotism, cf. Francis Parkman, The Old Régime in Canada, part 4, Boston: 1898.


25. This is one of the vital areas of 'police' identified by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, London: 1950, Volume II.


27. The key exception is the Duncombe Commission of 1835-6, appointed by the Assembly to tour the United States to investigate prisons, asylums, institutions for the deaf and dumb, and common schools. For Duncombe's

29. See note 27 above.
32. In educational matters in Canada West, as I document in Building, chapter 4, the communal school meeting was attacked. In the Baptist sect, matters of controversy were settled by a vote of (male?) churchgoers. See Stuart Ivison and Fred Rosser, The Baptists in Upper and Lower Canada before 1820, Toronto: 1963. A crucial question is the extent to which representation limited the power and influence women may have enjoyed under communal forms of government.
35. Lucas, Lord Durham, III, 280-7. Notice that 'talent' is a euphemism for men from the small capitalist and petty bourgeois classes.
37. Martin, Durham Report, 44-7, stresses the importance of Ellice, who it must be remembered, had substantial Canadian land holdings; also, D.E.T. Long, "The Elusive Mr. Ellice," Canadian Historical Review, XXIII, 1942, 42-57.
39. Russell to Poulett Thomson, 7 September 1839, in Kennedy, Documents, 519.

Ball, Her Majesty's Inspectorate, makes the point that Russell was engaged at this time as well in debates surrounding his attempts to introduce the Irish educational organization to England and Scotland.
40. Russell to Poulett Thomson, 14 October 1839, in Kennedy, Documents, 523.
41. Poulett Thomson to a friend, 20 November and 8 December 1839, in Kennedy, Documents, 529.
42. Russell to Sydenham, 25 October 1840; Sydenham to a friend, n.d. 1840, in Kennedy, Documents, 554-5.
43. Sydenham to a friend, n.d. 1840, in Kennedy, Documents, 555.
44. Poulett Thomson to Russell, 16 September 1840, in Kennedy, Documents, 552.
45. Sydenham to Scrope, 28 August 1841, in Kennedy, Documents, 563. Sydenham fell from his horse the day the act was proclaimed, injuring his leg. He was dead in two weeks.
46. J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, Toronto: 1956. Perhaps, as Alison Prentice has suggested, Hodgetts was intimidated by the size of the Education Records collection.
48. In addition to my Building, see for example, "Preconditions of the Canadian State: Educational Reform and the Construction of a Public in Upper Canada," SPE, 10, 1983; "Capitalist development and educational reform,"
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50. Once again it should be stressed not only that Poulett Scrope was an active supporter of Irish education, but also that Russell was attempting to introduce some version of Irish practice into England and Scotland via the Privy Council Committee on Education. Sydenham’s educational plans rework Irish models in light of Canadian experience.

51. In principle, again, adult male proprietors elected by other adult male proprietors. For Hincks, see note 11.

52. “All of this legislation is discussed in detail in my Building, and the texts of the Acts can be found in Hodgins, Documentary History.

53. For Buller, Lucas Lord Durham, III, 287-8; for Ryerson, Report on a System of Public Elementary Instruction for Upper Canada. Montreal: 1847, 176. Ryerson’s conclusion comes from one of the two most important texts on inspectoral method, Victor Cousin’s On the State of Education in Holland as Regards Schools for the Working Classes and for the Poor, London: 1838. This text was translated and introduced by Leonard Horner, the educationalist and factory inspector so much praised by Marx in Capital volume I. Horner was based in Manchester, where Poulett Thomson held his seat. Cousin stressed the flexibility and room for manoeuvre which we (bourgeois) could have in the Dutch as opposed to the Prussian system of inspection. The other key text was Cousin’s Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia... reprinted in E.W. Knight, ed., Reports on European Education... New York: 1930. The initial English translation of this report was made by Sarah Austin, herself a germanophile. She was married to John Austin, one of the commissioners to Malta, and the Austin’s garden looked over that of Bentham, replete with its flowerbeds in the form of a panopticon where the Austin children played with those of the Mills, another neighbour. Poulett Thomson was a frequent visitor. Here Cousin publicized the Pestalozzian methods of the Prussian educators and described their administrative practices.

54. See Public Archives of Ontario (PAO), Record Group 2 (RG2), Outgoing General Correspondence (C1), Letterbook C, Ryerson to Hopkirk, 3 March 1846.

55. This was done especially through the Journal of Education for Upper Canada after 1848. See for instance, 1,1, 1848, 23; 1,2, 1848, 58; 1,5, 1848, 129-35. For the circular to district superintendents of 1846, Hodgins, Documentary History, VI,29.

56. “On the Inspection of Common Schools,” Journal of Education for Upper Canada, 1, 5, 1848, 129-35. In House of Lords, Report of a select committee on the Irish education system (1838) Robertson is interviewed at length. Among other things he reveals that his hiring involved an examination by the commissioners into whether or not he was the right kind of person.

57. Evidence of Pinhey’s activities is scattered through the incoming correspondence of the education office. In a work in progress, tentatively titled The Formation of an Educational Inspectorate in Canada West, 1839-1851, Robert Lanning and I will also deal with the lengthy dispute between Ryerson and Patrick Thornton over the payment of a widowed teacher named Mrs. Merry.
58. John Bignall of the Huron District and William Fraser of the Eastern District. Bignall may well have taken as much as 800 pounds.

59. The initial classification was presented by Robert Lanning, "Recovering Categories for the Reconstruction of 19th Century Biographies," at the CSAA, Hamilton, 1987. Lanning stresses that these occupational classifications are not to taken as simple sociological categories; most of these people change their occupations frequently, and many hold more than one occupation. As I show in more detail in forthcoming work, the Superintendents were centrally situated in structures of political, economic and legal power in their localities.

60. For examples cited see G.E. Boyce, *Hutton of Hastings*. Hastings: 1972; PAO, RG2, Incoming General Correspondence (C6C), Elias Burnham, 22 September 1849, asks for advice about the expulsion of the Donnelly children from a common school; Benjamin Hayter, n.d. 1849, also mentions his consistent efforts to 'calm down' disputes.

61. PAO, RG2, C1D, Ryerson to Leslie, 12 May 1849. Ryerson claimed that school visits increased from 1847 to 1848 for clergy from 1,823 to 1,848; for District Councillors from 882 to 959; and for magistrates from 1,203 to 1,459; clear proof of respectable participation and interest in the schools.


63. PAO RG2 C6C, George Hendry, Woodstock, 28 October, 11 November 1846; C1C, Ryerson to Hendry, 7 November 1846.
