Does Misogyny Matter? Its reproduction and its consequences for social progress

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Does misogyny matter? In a sense the question is simply rhetorical, but I want to argue that it matters in a more systematic way than might be usually thought: it matters to us as teachers, students, researchers; matters to us as critics of our own society, critics of the existing relations of economic and political power between nations, classes, races, and of course the sexes. What I want to suggest is that misogyny is not a word useful simply for describing particularly nasty bits of behaviour, but rather directs us to a set of relations, attitudes, and behaviours that are embedded within all other social relationships. We therefore need to take this
into account when we analyze relations of economic exploitation, political power, racial and national hierarchies and the like. Those of us who consider ourselves on the left—that is, who seek not just to understand the world but to change it, and believe that the first can facilitate the second—must, I think, pay special heed to the questions and problems raised by misogyny. There are links between aborted, derailed or incomplete revolutions and the failure to fully attend to the sexual hierarchy, and it is important to try to understand these links more clearly.

But is this simply, then, the quintessentially socialist-feminist question about the relation between class and gender in a different guise? And if so, why choose a provocative word like misogyny (misogyny: hatred of women)?

My reason for doing so is that I want to focus upon the ideas, attitudes and feelings that accompany the now-acknowledged differential distribution of power and resources between men and women. Dominant power relations are accompanied by ideas legitimating those relations. But, as Raymond Williams has pointed out, the ideas themselves are constitutive of those power relations, are produced and reproduced even as the economic and political relations themselves are being reproduced. This can be seen especially clearly in the sexual hierarchy.

When we speak of misogyny, we are not only speaking of those who work in government offices or boardrooms, far away from the gentle, hallowed halls of our own university institutions. Queen's University, for instance, was rocked in the fall of 1986 by a brief written by Professor Sheila McIntyre after teaching one year in the Faculty of Law. Her treatment by some of her male students and one of her male colleagues in particular, was blatantly misogynist. She was unsuccessful in raising the interest of most of her other colleagues in her ordeal. When sympathetic, they were willing to blame her treatment on her age, her teaching inexperience or her personality—but never on her sex or her feminist perspective on the law. As she wrote in the introduction and explanation for her brief,

I hope we will stop interpreting individual incidents of sexism and antifeminism as anomalies or as proxies for other institutional problems. I do not deny that we have other institutional problems or that these problems
were often tangled into anti-woman or anti-feminist events. However, I have become exasperated and angered by the consistency with which gender has been so regularly factored out of our interpretations of these events, not least because I was so often the woman/feminist under attack.³

Reading her brief prompted me to discard a range of more polite titles for this article, which was first presented at Queen's University soon after the release of the McIntyre document, in the midst of the storm initiated by its disclosures. Sheila McIntyre's 'special' treatment was meted out because she brought a feminist critique to the study of law. Women are acceptable as teachers, it would seem, provided they accept the sexual hierarchy as given, do not incorporate its study into their curricula, and, therefore, do not raise the hackles—we should say, the anxieties—of their students by questioning their common sense, their deeply held beliefs and the behaviours that are animated by them.

Misogyny, in its various forms, leaves women bitter, confused and angry, and often—after that anger has spent itself—resigned. Pointing out misogyny can be risky, since guilt and denial are common male reactions. What is put forward here is a possible explanation for misogyny, of why it is so pervasive and so difficult to confront. I am not suggesting that this is the only, or even the best interpretation. But I do believe that it has a good deal of explanatory power and indicates how deeply rooted are the feelings underlying misogyny. This interpretation derives from psychoanalysis, and rests on my understanding of the argument developed by Gad Horowitz in his book, *Repression.*⁴

Such an interpretation cannot explain the origins of patriarchy; for those explanations we must look elsewhere. But there are three interrelated processes related to its perpetuation that are addressed. First, this interpretation can account for how men and women are made in social terms, and for how they are so tenaciously made. Second, it can account for the social reproduction of primarily heterosexual human beings out of bisexual human infants. Third, it can explain the social devaluation of what is perceived as femininity (with its more extreme manifestations in misogyny) and the overevaluation of what is perceived as masculinity. The social reproduction of heterosexual men and women, who place unequal value upon what is defined as masculinity and femininity, implies that a
whole range of needs, feelings, attitudes, desires and behav-
iours have to be repressed in the process.

For Freud, the human child begins as a bisexual being. As the child proceeds through the first three stages of ego development (oral, anal and phallic), s/he remains psychically bisex-ual. The biological differences between male and female do not yet register themselves psychically because the function of the dominant organ is experienced and represented in the same way in both sexes. A psychically bisexual child arrives at the oedipal stage. For children of both sexes, there are, at this time, not one but two oedipus complexes to traverse: the active and the passive. The following is a highly schematic presentation of the aspects of these processes that bear directly on the subject.

The Freudian analyst, Ruth Brunswick wrote many years ago that the male repudiation of femininity is “what we have come to consider the normal male contempt for women.” Much later, in an article The New Left Review, Richard Wollheim argued that “what women have suffered from over the centuries is man’s inability to tolerate the feminine side of his nature.” For when the bisexual male child falls in love with his father, in what can be called the passive oedipal complex, he realizes soon enough that in a patriarchal world, where all legitimate sexuality is heterosexual and genital, he must repress that love or risk the fear of castration. For in this patriarchal world, only women can be penetrated, and only by men. In the struggle of small boys to repress their longing for their fathers, for the passive side of sexuality, they seek to avoid the danger—the fear of castration—that accompanies desire for the father and identification with the female parent.

Such an interpretation may appear rather far-fetched. Its plausibility for me was strengthened as I observed my own loving little boy go through those years when my suggestions were anathema, and his father, with whom he was now seeking to identify, could do little wrong. So I talked to other mothers who were not having their heads befogged by the learned books that I was reading, and discovered that their sons also went through this stage of transparent contempt.

But this is not the whole story. For if males alone incorpo-rated feelings of contempt for women in the course of their psychic development, the rest of us would be simply laughing
our heads off and never taking no for an answer. Why does this happen so seldom? Freud came to the realization, with considerable surprise, that the girl child, like her brother, has a love affair with her mother: “We knew, of course, that there had been a preliminary stage of attachment to the mother, but we did not know that it could be so rich in content and so long-lasting... Almost everything that we find later in her relation to her father was already present in this earlier attachment and has been transferred subsequently onto her father.”

She, too, has come to realize that in this patriarchal, heterosexual world, this kind of love for her mother is out of the question, and indeed that she should not have those feelings for women in general. In renouncing love for those of her sex, she abandons her homosexuality, in this case her active libidinal aims. In such a renunciation, her penis envy—for all children of both sexes will desire the organs and possibilities of the other—will become intense penis envy. Because she cannot have what she so much desires—and what is so socially valued—she too is left with feelings of contempt for the feminine. But unlike the male child, she must live out the characteristics that she has repudiated. We could add then to Brunswick’s statement—that what we have here is the ‘normal’ female contempt for women.

In the case of both boys and girls, then, attention is drawn not just to those men whose misogynist practices and words leap out to declare themselves. What also needs to be examined is the ‘normal’ contempt for women by men and women that comes far more ambivalently clothed—entangled with love and appreciation for women by men, by men for each other and by women for ourselves. For example, a very nice male colleague asked me not long ago how I liked being in the sociology department. My positive answer elicited this reply: “I guess it’s all right as long as you can stand the company of so many women”. Frankly I was floored, but simply replied that this was a situation devoutly to be wished for, since I had to spend most of my time with a woman—me.

In large measure, of course, what the contemporary women’s movement has been about is the valorization of ourselves and each other—hard work for many women who during adolescence had come to see other women as competitors for
the real prize, men. Robin Morgan’s question, “after so many centuries of spending all our compassion on men could we not spare a little for each other?” resonated with many of us. Even now one of our greatest challenges is to find ways to work with each other supportively and effectively. Even when we come to tolerate the weaknesses of our consœurs, we have difficulty living with critical acceptance of our own. But the real point is that there are simply not enough of us to stand by and watch a good woman go down. And this is even more true for our students, especially our graduate students. Many of them are in scarcely concealed despair as they try to balance the apparently unbalanceable, a feat that can only be resolved, if not achieved, through that elusive self-acceptance, including the acceptance of their own potential as scholars. I do not believe that most men have any idea how difficult it is for most women to make intellectual claims, as they come to realize how profoundly they are trespassing upon ‘male’ territory. (Of course, it would be easier if men were not so vigilant in protecting ‘their’ terrain.)

Susan Russell chanced upon evidence of such female self-denigration while doing research at an academic high school in Ottawa in 1977. During long interviews, she asked the grade 12 students how they had been doing and whether their grades had gone up or down since grade 9. The boys were very positive about their performances, describing how their marks had gotten much better. The girls were quite negative, noting how their grades had been falling. At first Susan interpreted this as a sign that male students had begun to realize that school was a serious affair and had buckled down to work, while the girls were receiving and acting upon the inevitable messages about the priority of marriage and family. But to her considerable surprise, when she checked the interviews against performance, she discovered that in many cases the boys’ marks had fallen considerably, while the girls had maintained or improved their grades. Male bravado and female reticence were alive and well at this high school!

Still, all is not bleak. Our female students will, I believe, be far better off than us: some of the deck-clearing has been done. Their right to pursue their own stars is seldom challenged publicly anymore, at least not in the university. If nothing else, some behaviour modification has occurred, so
that lack of support is not as virulently displayed. And in terms of research and theoretical development in feminist scholarship, many of the big questions have at least been posed, if scarcely answered. Yet the interaction between women's own self-doubt and those who would keep them doubting can still be daunting.

Before proceeding, let me make it clear I am not arguing that the feelings and attributes fed by misogyny and contempt for women have the field to themselves, either in the consciousness or unconscious of men or women. If that were the case, we would surely not be here to tell the tale.

But does misogyny matter to anything beyond the relations between the sexes and the feminist agenda? Does it matter to liberation movements based on class, nation, race, or some intersection of these? Does it matter to the peace movement? Can those who struggle in these movements expect the transformations they seek—and may even be prepared to die for—without recognizing and dealing with the systematically structured hierarchy between the sexes, fuelled as it is (or so I have argued) by the internalization of contempt for self and others?

The answer to this question was suggested in one of the first books published within the contemporary women's liberation movement. In 1970, in The Dialectic of Sex, Shulamith Firestone developed the first systematic account of the radical feminist theoretical perspective. Although the book never found favour with those men and women of the left who read it, it has now also fallen out of the good graces of the current generation of radical feminists whose predecessors so warmly embraced it. This is primarily because she posited that the sexual hierarchy is based in nature itself, that the unequal allotment of reproductive tasks has allowed men but not women to make the world. Reproductive technology would have to be enlisted to shift the balance, freeing women to create a truly human society (indeed a socialist society, for Firestone despite her malignment by the left—including socialist feminists—was no bourgeois feminist seeking for women half of the already constituted pie).¹¹

Today's radical feminists have quite rightly insisted that women's role as child bearers and mothers needs to be revalorized, and that Firestone herself had fallen into the trap of
confirming society’s greater valorization of male activities over female. While they insist that the conditions under which women ‘mother’ must be transformed, they argue that biology itself need not be transcended. And socialist feminists, with their properly skeptical view of the state and, more generally, of the power relations in capitalist society, agree that women must retain—and where it has been lost, take back—control over reproduction.

But Firestone did much more than postulate technological solutions. I thought then, and still think that *The Dialectic of Sex* was a brilliant book, with its giant speculative leaps and imaginative analysis. Firestone posited that the original, unequal relationship in human society was between women and men, and was rooted in their unequal freedom to do non-reproductive labour: “Nature produced the fundamental inequality—half the human race must bear and rear the children of all of them—which was later consolidated, institutionalized in the interests of men. Reproduction of the species cost women dearly, not only emotionally, psychologically, culturally but even in strictly material (physical) terms: before recent methods of contraception, continuous childbirth led to constant “female trouble”, early ageing and death.”

Feminist anthropologists and historians are, it is true, writing more nuanced versions of early human society, and the variations are breath-taking. But it seems clear that female subordination predates class society, that Engel’s “world historic defeat of the female sex” could hardly have been accomplished so easily if women had shared equally with men in the power and resources of the society. What made it possible for men to appropriate women’s labour, sexuality, and children, and to do so with such universal success? Firestone’s enormously plausible account may be unpopular. It may be politically unwise, as some feminists have claimed, playing into the hands of those all too willing to believe that our inferiority is rooted in our bodies. But this does not make it wrong.

If Firestone had contented herself with exposing human society’s original inequality and locating its source in biological difference, she still would have had more critics than disciples. But she went further. “Marx was onto something more profound than he knew”, she claimed, “when he observed that the family contained within itself in embryo all the antagonisms
that later develop on a wide scale within the society and the state." This was because "a psychology of power" had developed within the biological family, originally caused by the sexual division of labour but perpetuated and sustained by men as they sought to consolidate their privileges, and by women whose ideas about themselves mirrored their subordinate position. It is this "psychology of power"—its nature and perpetuation—that can, I have argued, be understood through the psychoanalytic interpretation offered by Horowitz. Firestone argued that this unequal relationship between the sexes was "the tapeworm of exploitation" that fed the other systematic unequal relationships, between classes, races, and adults and children.

Now, if sexual inequality underpins other kinds of inequalities, as Firestone argued, the variety of complex historical trajectories through which this happened will indeed be difficult to piece together. But in the great rush to re-assert Engels' account—that class and sex inequality accompany each other onto the world stage, the second in the immediate wake of the first—do we not abandon the makings of a potentially powerful interpretation of human history? It is an interpretation that could help account for the near universality of female oppression; for the refusal of revolutionary movements to incorporate the struggle for sexual equality fully into their strategies and goals; for the consequent terrible failure of some of their successes; and, for the partial and distorted practices of even those revolutions that have made the most difference to the alleviation of human misery?

How could all this be related? How can we move from Firestone's theory on the origins of inequality to a consideration of the consequences of current-day manifestations of these inequalities? First, let us note the near-tautology: that the absence of women in decision-making positions produces their subsequent absence. In human society, their absence can be noted as soon as decision-making moves beyond providing for day-to-day survival needs, as soon as production and reproduction cease being completely co-terminous. As this happens (if not before) women spend more time than men in child rearing—they always spent more time in child-bearing and suckling—and become increasingly removed from evermore centralized processes of decision-making epitomized in the
development of the state. This happens precisely because they bear the children; surely Firestone got this right. (The more popular, present-day radical feminist interpretation suggests that patriarchy is rooted in men’s natural predilection for violence, and in particular, in their sexuality: essentialist arguments about men and women are once again academically respectable and high on the public feminist agenda.) Second, those making decisions—the men—fail to locate the experiences, concerns and hardships of women within the matrix of the decision-makers’ perceptions, goals and strategies.

Third, the failure of decision-makers to place the concerns of women in a central location has been mirrored by the failure of (male) observers, analysts and researchers to do so. Today, in response to feminist pressure, there is a ritual process of “tacking on” a focus on women to research projects and theoretical formulations—or even of including it in the apologia, as “what we would have liked to do if we’d had $500,000 and fifty years”. That may or may not be useful, depending on the goal of the study and the nature of the tack-on. But if the analysis does not locate a two-sexed human race at its core, it is partial and biased.

Rethinking our theoretical formulations in an incisive way is very difficult. Several years ago, I tried to develop an interpretation of how the position and roles of women changed during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. It did not occur to me to ask how women had contributed actively to the realization of that transition. Recently Christopher Middleton—a person of the other sexual persuasion, it will be noted—pointed out the essential role that women, as wives, had played in the accumulation of surplus within the household economy, a crucial factor because it made possible subsequent capitalist investment. By looking at this process, Middleton was able to see also that this surplus, produced by women’s labour, came under the control of their husbands—that is, patriarchal control had intensified, had located itself on a firmer material base—during the course of the transition to capitalism.

The need for this kind of analysis—analysis which takes questions of gender seriously—can be illustrated by looking at the field of development studies. The literature on development appears itself to be developing along discrete paths, with
the debates on the development of underdevelopment, the theoretical work on modes of production and their articulation, and the study of the resistance of societies to capitalist encroachment proceeding with little or no theoretical attention to the ways in which both the encroaching and the indigenous economies are gendered and patriarchal. That the implications of policies are very different for men and women; that the existing sexual organization of the non-western economy will help shape the response (whether resistant or accommodation) to loss of land; that new 'opportunities' for making a living—that is, the new forms of exploitation—are gendered: all of this too often goes unremarked. This literature has become much more sophisticated in its understanding of how the elites of the so-called underdeveloped economies have collaborated with foreign interests, and of how indigenous forms of economic exploitation play into and are reshaped by outside interests. Nonetheless, the role played by sexual oppression and the interests of men in maintaining dominance during the transition is seldom explored, in either the theoretical discourse or the research strategies.

This sex blindness at the level of theory is often accompanied by the belief that indigenous forms of gender relations are not oppressive, or, if they are, that they should be left alone in the interests of cultural self-determination. This amounts to an acceptance of the right of men to perpetuate their dominance. Even those who decry extreme forms of cultural relativism when confronting class relations, have been known to invoke relativism when confronting blatant and systematic misogynist practices. What right have we, they ask, to judge the behaviours of people whose societies have been transformed so irrevocably by the imperalist interests of the west? If the issue of sexual inequality is raised, it is assumed to be simply a part of imported capitalist relations, or solely the concern of the women of the bourgeoisie.

Feminists in the west, on the other hand, have not been so sanguine about these practices in the non-western world, and they are being vindicated through the arguments of feminists from many countries. Dr. Nawaal El Saadawi, while on a visit to Canada in 1986, addressed this issue passionately, appearing incredulous when she heard that feminists in the west are often charged with ethnocentrism for wishing to 'export' fem-
anism to 'inappropriate' terrains. Her book, *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World*, begins with a graphic description of her own experience of being circumcised as a small girl. Looking up from her bed of terror and pain, she saw not only strangers who seemed to be enjoying it all hugely, but also her mother smiling and talking. So where are we to come down on this issue? The practice is accepted—the mother is smiling—who are we to enter the fray? My view is that if there is only one Arab woman screaming against the practice, that is where we stand.

Let us now relate this back to Firestone's argument that sexual inequality underpins, or makes more likely, the development and maintenance of other forms of inequality. Let us also take into account the psychoanalytic interpretation that our earliest experiences are shaped in a myriad of ways by women and men who expect and receive a certain kind of treatment from each other because they are women and because they are men; and, furthermore, that this treatment displays both contempt for women and its corollary, the overvalorization of men. The internalization of these feelings occurs, and substitutes at the conscious level for the anxiety raised through desiring the same-sexed parent. Contempt for women represents the repression of homosexual desire. Depending on the particular childhood experiences, this anxiety can be more or less acute, summon up fear and terror, or just discomfort.

I have argued that in early childhood in a patriarchal society, men develop, to a lesser or greater extent, the capacity to feel contempt for women—the 'hidden' side of their own personality—and, therefore, the capacity to behave accordingly. Women, for their part, develop a contempt for self and those of their sex.

The Frankfurt School of critical theorists encountered similar findings when trying to identify the pre-fascist personality. Although they had no theory of gender inequality, and tended to treat the family and parenting as a unit, some of their results support an interpretation that links repression of femininity with anti-semitism and fascism. In a study of Nazi prisoners of war, they tried to distinguish the personality traits of those who had been committed fascists from those who were not. Those in the group considered high in fascist traits
were characterized by a tenderness taboo, sadism, homosexual trends, projection, anxiety, low identification with the mother, and lack of rebellion against the father.  

In another study in 1950, they compared prejudiced and non-prejudiced children. Here they found a tendency toward rigid and exaggerated conceptions of masculinity and femininity in the prejudiced male child. For these children, the ‘real boy’ must be a regular guy who knows how to fight, is tough and not a sissy. They characterized the perfect girl by such statements as “isn’t filthy minded, not too rough, not a tomboy”. The unprejudiced boys said things like ‘she’s pretty and she’s got brains. She’s not too scared. She likes dogs’!

These are old studies. Yet the findings are particularly interesting because these researchers were not feminists at work, and they do not appear to have been looking for what they found. But in citing them, all I am suggesting is that in any society we are seeking to understand—including our own—we should analyze the relations between men and women in all of their aspects in order to help explain the level of tolerance for other forms of contempt for others: abusive behaviour; beliefs in the ‘enemy within’; homophobia; the behaviour of those in jobs where displays of violence are considered legitimate; war-mongering; obsessive needs for power and control; and so on.

I am not suggesting a reductionist kind of explanation. Not only is the human capacity to perpetuate horrors matched by an often unheralded courage to resist them, but the explanations for both are rich in detail and variation, and often simply elusive. My argument is only that the power of one half of the human race—whether it is openly glorified, paternalistic, protective, or systematically denied—is fuelled and shored up by contempt for the other half, and is held in place by the anxiety that comes from the constantly demanding challenge of repressing those desires and characteristics in oneself. If this is true, then we must find ways of including questions of gender construction, sexual inequality, and sexuality at the heart of our research and theoretical work, and, of course, at the core of our political work.

There is no blueprint here as to how to continue. But there are at least two kinds of questions to be considered that follow from what I have said. First, in analyzing both macro and
micro economic relations, an analysis of the household—both in its integration with the rest of the economic/political system, and in its interrelated internal dynamics—must be included. Understanding the division of labour, and the differential allocation of power between the sexes, is as important as understanding the relations between peasants and landlords, or wage workers and employers. Knowing how state policies affect women may be even more important than knowing how they affect men, for the state contributes not just to the reproduction of class relations, but also to the reproduction, maintenance, and nurturing of patriarchal relations. Furthermore, the welfare state was fought for by women, and however much the social control function of the state seems to predominate, we should not be surprised that women are active in resisting the dismantling of those aspects of the state which have, however inadequately, served their interests.

These questions will also lead to more powerful explanations as to who participates in movements for liberation, how they participate, whether they resist inclusion or actively oppose it, and which policies are undertaken as successful social movements transform themselves into state governments. Not to be too abstract about it, why are the issues around women, family, and sexuality the first to be abandoned in the post-revolutionary situation?

Of course I dwell upon the dangers of not dealing adequately with the hierarchical relations between men and women in liberation movements—and in the governments they form when successful—because it is here, I believe, that the better chance for women exists—there is at least lip-service (and often more) paid to the struggle for sexual equality. This remains—despite all the disappointments—the specifically socialist-feminist hope, as Lynne Segal argues so eloquently in her recent book, *Is the Future Female?* But as she also points out, “unless and until the labour movement and the left can take on board a feminist vision which concerns itself with the nature of all human relationships, it can never hope to appeal to the majority of the people.” She continues:

We need feminist ideas to travel all the way up and all the way down our present hierarchies of power. Ideologically this means challenging all our assumptions of masculinity and femininity which express notions of dominance and submission, with the heterosexual male as the central, self-
asserting, authoritative representative of 'humanity'. And this takes us back to sex, and to violence, and to the politics of the personal: to the reshaping of the desires where women's bodies are sexual commodities for men, and where men's bodies are on longer defined through the phallus, and used as the symbol of a masculinity which is coercive and oppressive to women. Women and men might then begin to enjoy once again those childhood pleasures as both object and subject of desire, might escape from their restricting and compulsive sexual obsessions into more mutual sexual encounters.30

We must, then, ask questions about how the power differential between men and women manifests itself in everyday life. What is the scope and form of violence towards women? In the Third World, what were the indigenous misogynist practices, and how are they shaped and transformed by those imported from the First World along with the social relations of capitalism?29 How do these practices inform the behaviour of comrades toward each other—men and women—and towards those whom they perceive as 'other' and therefore as appropriate objects for contempt.

Learning to perceive others as 'other' is intrinsic to the very process of becoming human, of apprehending oneself as a separate being. The baby has no such understanding, but gradually comes to an awareness—a difficult awareness—that his/her caretaker (usually, and not without profound consequences, the mother32) is not simply an extension of self. But much depends on how that lesson is taught. In other words, the process through which the other comes to be viewed with either respect and identification, or contempt and anxiety is an historical-political process, even though the site is the individual psyche. A psychoanalytic account cannot answer such questions as why are all known societies characterized in some way by male dominance, and, how do men and women come to collude with those arrangements?

Whoever coined the famous slogan—especially beloved by feminists—that the personal is political, spoke better than s/he knew. Our best hope, I believe, for appreciating the role of misogyny in the conduct of human affairs is through exercising our own enormous potential for self-reflection and informed observation—and through communicating to our students what a fundamental aspect of the learning process this is. Then, since our goal is not just to understand the world but to change it, we can more consciously engage in the
struggle to liberate ourselves and others from the enormously debilitating costs of misogyny.

Notes
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2. Sheila McIntyre's brief was reprinted in the January Bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers.
3. Sheila McIntyre, "Gender Bias within the Law School" (Memo to All Members of Faculty Board, 28 July 1986) CAUT Bulletin, January 1987.
4. There have been several feminist appropriations of psychoanalysis, and here I am only asserting the one I find most persuasive. Of course, psychoanalytic explanations remain controversial, both within feminism and on the left generally. I believe that Gad Horowitz's book Repression: Basic and Surplus Repression in Psychoanalytic Theory. Freud, Reich and Marcuse (Toronto, 1977) has a great deal to offer feminists and people on the left in their quest to understand oppressive psycho-sexual structures. I have explored this more fully in "The Collusion with Patriarchy: A Psychoanalytic Account," in Alternate Routes (1983) reprinted in The Politics of Diversity, eds. Roberta Hamilton and Michele Barrett (London, 1986).
11. As Firestone put it in The Dialectic of Sex, (New York, 1970), p. 207, "we must talk about a feminist socialism."
13. We have never heard from Shulamith again. From a comment Robin Morgan made in "Good-bye to all that," I divined that she had committed herself to a mental hospital. My heart aches for my sister, Shulamith, who deserved better than she got.
14. Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, p. 205. (See n. 11, above.)
15. See, for example, Janet Siltanen's review in Resources for Feminist Research VIII:1 (March 1979), p. 60.
16. Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, p. 11-12.
18. For a thoughtful analysis of the development of this 'new' radical feminist perspectives, see Hester Eisenstein, *Contemporary Feminist Thought* (Boston, 1983).

19. See Pat and Hugh Armstrong on this question, as well as the ensuing debate with Patricia Connelly in *Studies in Political Economy* 10, 12 and 15, all reprinted in *The Politics of Diversity*.


21. See the review by E.A. Nora Cebotarev, "Research on Rural Women: An International Perspective," in *Resources for Feminist Research* 11:1 (March 1982), p. 28–32. (This issue is called "Women and Agricultural Production").


23. See the plea from Hannah Edemikpong of the Women's Centre of Cross River State, Nigeria in *Horizons* (September 1986).


30. Ibid., p. 245.

31. In her survey of the literature, Nora Cebotarev concludes that "the net result of "development" in rural areas appears to be an accentuation of sex-role asymmetry and the expansion of the work loads and work hours of rural women, without necessarily the appropriate social or economic recognition of these facts." *Resources in Feminist Research* 11:1. See also Mervat Hatem, "The Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: The Case of Modern Egypt," in *Feminist Issues* 6:1 (Spring 1986), p. 19–44.

32. See, for example, Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (California, 1978) and Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (New York, 1977) for two interpretations of these implications.